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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court exists pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) 
Utah Code Ann. (2001) which provides that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
final orders and decrees in formal ad|tidie.iii\ e proceedings originating \vifli ihr hiblii1 
Service ('onmussioii (the "Commission"). This appeal is from the Report and Order 
dated July 21, 2000 issued by the Commission in Docket No. 98-2216-01. 1 
. - f ; T , V I I : M I ' I N T < H < I I . 1 ssi'i-:s 
1 Whet I iei (I n • ( \ »mmission abused its discretion or exceeded the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality when it determined that Western Wireless had not met its 
burden of establishing that it was in the public interest to designate Western \\ Heless as 
an eligible teleconmniiiie<ilions caniei ("KIT") 
2. Whether the Commission's Report and Order is supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. 
3 Whether the Commission erred in icquu in^ llial Westetn tireless price its 
services at or below I he rale eharged by the incumbent carrier in order to receive State 
universal service support funds. 
PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Slatiftui' I'treri MIHK nil t'entrnl iniptmianee to llii -ippeal are 47 U.S.C. § 214(e), 47 
1
 The Commission's Report and Order is reproduced in Petitioner's Addendum beginning 
ADD-1. References to the Record on Appeal will be cited as "R , p, ." 
1 
U.S.C. § 254, Section 63-46a-2(16)(c) Utah Code Ann. (2001 and Section 63-46b-16(4) 
Utah Code Ann. (2001). These first three provisions are set forth in the Petitioner's 
Addendum or in the Commission's brief. Section 63-46b-16(4) Utah Code Ann. (2001) 
provides as follows: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) The agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) The persons taking agency action were illegally constituted as 
a decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made 
or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court: 
(h) The agency action is: 
(i) An abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute: 
(ii) Contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) Contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons 
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) Otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) Utah Code Ann. (2001) (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Western Wireless filed a petition with the Commission on August 31, 1998, 
2 
seeking designation as an ETC in order to qualify for receiving universal service support 
from both the federal and state universal service funds. (R00001, WWC Holding Co., 
Inc's Petition). 
URTA, on behalf of its member companies, sought to intervene in the proceeding 
below. (R00006, Petition for Intervention of URTA). On December 16, 1998, the 
Commission granted the petition to intervene. (R00007, Order Granting Intervention). 
URTA is an association comprised of the independent telephone companies of the State 
of Utah. Each member of URTA is: (1) an "incumbent local exchange carrier" ("LEC") 
as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 252(h); (2) a "rural telephone company" as defined by 47 
U.S.C. §153(47)); and (3) the only designated ETC in its respective service area. (URTA 
members are sometimes referred to hereafter as "rural telephone companies"). URTA 
requested that the Commission make an inquiry and determination based on 47 U.S.C. 
Section 214(e) whether Western Wireless should be designated as an ETC in areas served 
by the rural telephone companies that are URTA members. (R00006, Petition for 
Intervention of URTA). 
URTA, Qwest Communications, the Division and the Committee each opposed 
Western Wireless' petition to be granted ETC status. All of these parties asserted that 
Western Wireless failed to provide an adequate record to establish that any purported 
benefits of ETC designation outweighed the evidence of serious detriments to universal 
service in rural Utah. 
A hearing on Western Wireless' petition was held on November 30 and December 
3 
1,1999. (R00220 and R00221 Transcript of Proceedings in Docket No. 98-2216-01, 
11-30-99 and 12-1-99, hereinafter "Transcript"). Western Wireless offered testimony 
through one witness. Each of the other parties in the Docket also offered testimony and 
evidence that it would not be in the public interest to designate Western Wireless as an 
ETC. This testimony is described in more detail below. 
On July 21, 2000, the Commission issues its Report and Order in which it granted 
Western Wireless ETC status in the service territory of Qwest Communications, - a non-
rural carrier and denied ETC status in the URTA members rural service territory. 
(R00198, Report and Order). The Commission concluded that it would not be in the 
public interest to designate Western Wireless as in ETC in the rural telephone companies' 
study areas. The Commission was concerned about the possible negative impacts on 
Utah's Universal Public Telecommunications Service Support Fund (the "Fund") without 
corresponding public benefits. (R00198, Report and Order, p. 12-13). The 
Commission recognized that designation of Western Wireless as an ETC could have a 
serious negative impact on the burdens placed on the state Fund. (R00198, Report and 
Order, p. 13). The Commission also observed that since Western Wireless' prices are 
likely to be up to 125 percent of the incumbent's prices, offering a lower cost service was 
not a benefit that balances out the public interest equation. (Id.) 
Western Wireless filed a request for reconsideration or rehearing. (R00210, 
Request for Reconsideration or Rehearing). After 20 days, this request was deemed 
denied and the appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission's Report and Order should be affirmed. The Court should not 
substitute its judgment for the Commission's determination that Western Wireless did not 
meet the burden of establishing the public interest was served by designating it as a 
second ETC in areas of the State served by rural telephone companies. Contrary to 
Western Wireless' argument, this Court should not enter affirmative findings of fact that 
Western Wireless is entitled to ETC designation as having met the public interest 
standard. Such an action would be contrary to firmly established precedent. The 
public interest is a matter that the state commission is specifically charged by statute to 
determine and is a prerequisite to granting ETC status in rural service areas. Such a 
determination must be upheld on appeal if it is supported by any substantial evidence. 
Congress fully recognized that competition, by itself, will not produce the intended 
universal service results in lower volume, higher cost, rural areas and Congress adopted 
explicit universal service provisions to deal with potentially detrimental impacts of 
competition contrary to the public interest in such rural areas. That is precisely why 
Congress gave state commissions the ability to refuse to designate a second ETC in rural 
areas. If Congress had intended that promoting competition be the sole criterion in 
determining ETC status, there would have been no purpose in requiring a separate public 
interest finding as a prerequisite to ETC designation in rural areas, since all requesting 
carrier, being additional competitors, would be designated ETCs. 
The Commission acted reasonably and appropriately in denying ETC status to 
5 
Western Wireless. Western Wireless failed to set forth an adequate record upon which 
the Commission could have determined that its ETC designation would be in the public 
interest. The principle problem with Western Wireless' approach is that it asked the 
Commission to accept its bare assertions without any data or support. Western Wireless 
never provided to the Commission information on its universal service offering, its 
pricing and its approach to customer-specific issues The record does not establish that 
the purported benefits of such a designation outweigh the detrimental impacts the 
designation could have on rural Utah and the state Fund. The record establishes that 
such a designation would in fact be contrary to the public interest. The Commission 
found that such a designation may have an adverse impact on the preservation and 
advancement of universal service. Under-utilization of the incumbent telephone 
company's network, stranded capacity and the increased use of universal service funds to 
mitigate network economy losses, increased costs and increased prices of service in rural 
Utah were among the detriments of ETC designation that outweighed any potential 
benefits. 
Finally, the Commission's requirement that Western Wireless price its services at 
no more than the affordable base rate was not erroneous. This ruling was consistent with 
the Commission's statutory mandate to ensure that rates are just, reasonable and 
affordable. When Western Wireless crossed the boundary from being just another 
common carrier, to becoming an ETC (in Qwest territories) and to receive universal 
service funds, it lost its exemption from rate regulation, to the extent that its rates must 
be affordable 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Impact on Universal Service is the Principal Determinant of Public Interest. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act") grants states explicit authority to 
determine which carriers should be designated ETCs. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2) (1999). 
Only ETCs designated by a state commission are entitled to receive universal service 
support. In the Matter of Federal-State Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 
CC Docket No. 96-45, 12 FCC Red 88776 (May 8, 1997) ("Universal Service Order"), 
corrected in CC Docket No. 96-45 Erratum, FCC 97-157 (June 4, 1997), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, remanded in part sub, nom. Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F. 
3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999). 
Under the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the 1996 Act, the United 
States adopted a two-pronged telecommunications policy. The 1996 amendments created 
a pro-competitive telecommunications policy. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 253, -
Interconnections and Removal of Barriers to Entry. In addition, the historical policy of 
universal service, 47 U.S.C. § 151, was re-emphasized in the 1996 amendments: 
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers 
and those in rural, insular and high cost areas, should have access to 
telecommunications and information services, including interexchange 
services and advanced telecommunications and information services, that 
are reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas and 
that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged 
for similar services in urban areas. 
47 U.S.C. § 254. Thus, after the 1996 amendments, the two-pronged telecommunications 
policy includes a preference for a competitive market structure for the delivery of 
7 
telecommunications services, and a commitment to preservation and advancement of 
universal service. 
A competitive market policy is modified, however, by specific safeguards in the 
Act that reflect Congress' realization that rural service areas may not be amenable to a 
competitive market. The safeguard provisions include a careful examination by a State 
commission of whether more than one carrier should be designated to receive universal 
service support in a rural service area. Section 214(e) of the Act provides: 
Upon request, and consistent with public interest, convenience and 
necessity, the State Commission may, in the case of an area served by a 
rural telephone company, and shall in the case of all other areas, designate 
more than one common carrier as an eligible telecommunications carrier for 
a service area designated by the State commission....Before designating an 
additional eligible telecommunications carrier for an area served by a rural 
telephone company, the State commission shall find that the designation is 
in the public interest. 
47 U.S.C. § 214(e) (emphasis added). The Act provides the state commission great 
discretion in regard to certification of ETCs in rural LEC areas. Before the commission 
may designate more than one ETC within any service area served by a rural telephone 
company, the Act requires that it must "find that the designation is in the public interest". 
See 47 U.S.C. §214(e). 
The Act then recognizes that not all carriers are entitled to be designated as ETCs 
by the state commission. However, Western Wireless takes the position that by 
designating it as an additional ETC, competition will result and that, since, it argues, 
competition is in the public interest, the public interest test is thereby met. (R0051, 
Prefiled Direct Testimony of Gene DeJordy, p. 21; See also Petitioner's Brief, p. 23-25). 
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This simplistic argument misses the very point that the Act incorporates: competition can 
have a detrimental impact contrary to the public interest in rural service areas. It also 
ignores the adverse impacts of such designation. Moreover, the record does not lead to 
the conclusion advanced by Western Wireless that there are significant benefits in such a 
designation. It is clear that such so-called benefits, do not overcome the detriments of 
such designation as set forth in the record, in order to justify an ETC designation.2 All 
of the other parties in the docket below, took the position that the potential detriments of 
ETC designation outweighed any purported benefits. 
If Congress had intended that competition be the sole or controlling criterion, there 
would be no purpose in a separate public interest finding and all requesting carriers 
would be designated ETCs because each additional carrier is another competitor. But 
universal service policy goals are separate from the promotion of competition. Congress 
fully recognized that competition, by itself, will not produce the intended universal 
service results in lower volume, higher cost, rural areas and Congress adopted explicit 
universal service provisions to deal with potentially detrimental impacts of competition 
contrary to the public interest in such rural areas. That is precisely why Congress gave 
state commissions the ability to refuse to designate a second ETC in rural areas. The 
unequivocal language of section 214(e) providing that an additional eligible 
2
 Contrary to Western Wireless' contention, the Commission didn't specifically find 
there would be "no benefits" by designating Western Wireless an ETC. See Petitioner's Brief, at 
p. 2, 9. Instead, the Report and Order and the record support the conclusion that the detriments 
to such designation outweighed any benefits and that, therefore, such a designation was not in the 
public interest. 
9 
telecommunications carrier "may" be designated in rural service areas - as distinguished 
from "all other areas" where an additional carrier "shall" be designated - illustrates that a 
policy favoring designation of a competitive ETC does not apply to rural service areas. 
Thus, contrary to Western Wireless' assertion, competition alone does not establish the 
public interest. 
The public interest determination requires an examination of the impacts arising 
from the introduction of a second ETC in rural areas and consideration of the effects such 
impacts have upon the public interest. Here, the Commission balanced the question of 
competition against the public policy objectives of universal service and found that 
Western Wireless had not established that it was entitled to ETC designation. The 
Commission found that such a designation may have an adverse impact on the 
preservation and advancement of universal service. (R00198, Report and Order, p. 12-
13). 
Contrary to what Western Wireless contends, a prohibition on competition is not 
at issue here. The rural telephone companies are not requesting protection from 
competition. Western Wireless already operates and competes in the rural exchanges 
and URTA does not seek to prevent that. Rather, the refusal to designate a second ETC 
is a mechanism to limit the availability of universal service support funds. The rural 
telephone companies seek to limit access to universal service funds because of the 
adverse impacts on such funds recognized by the Commission in its Report and Order. 
10 
II. Applying the Appropriate Standard of Review, The Court should Give 
Deference to and Affirm the Commission 
The fundamental threshold question is whether it is in the public interest for any 
additional ETC to be designated in an area served by a rural telephone company. 
Resolution of this fundamental question is a matter to be determined by the state 
commission.3 This determination is a question of fact, or at most, a mixed issue of fact 
and law. In either case, the Court should grant deference to the Commission's 
determination that ETC designation to Western Wireless is not in the public interest. 
When reviewing matters of fact, the Court affords great deference to the 
Commission's findings, "upholding those based on evidence of any substance." 
Telecommunications Resellers of Utah vs. Public Service Commission, 747 P.2d 1029, 
1030 (Utah 1987). In Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission. 734 P. 2d 431 (Utah 1986), the Court stated: "[i]n deciding whether the 
Commission's factual findings will sustain its transfer of the certificate, we must review 
those findings with the 'greatest degree of deference' and affirm those findings where 
they are supported by evidence of 'any substance whatever.'" IdL at 433. (citations 
omitted). The provision that there be substantial evidence to support a finding does not 
require or specify a quantity of evidence but requires only "such relevant evidence as a 
3
 47 U.S.C. 214(e). "The discretion afforded a state commission under section 214(e)(2) 
is the discretion to decline to designate more than one eligible carrier in an area that is served by a 
rural telephone company; in that context, the state commission must determine whether the 
designation of an additional eligible carrier is in the public interest." Universal Service Order, ^  
135. 
11 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Court gives deference to the 
administrative agency on questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from 
which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of 
witnesses' recollections. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1997). 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) Utah Code Ann. (2001), in discussing appellate court 
review of administrative agency actions, indicates that the Court should grant relief only 
if: "[t]he agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." (emphasis added).4 All legitimate inferences drawn from such 
factual findings are examined in the light most favorable to the agency's findings. See 
Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Division. 842 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1992). As set forth 
below, based on the record as a whole, there was substantial evidence before the 
Commission that reasonably supported its conclusion. Moreover, there was insufficient 
evidence submitted by Western Wireless to sustain another conclusion. 
For mixed findings of fact and law, Commission orders "must be rationally based 
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the 
'tolerable limits of reason.'" Telecommunications Resellers, supra. 747 P.2d at 1030, 
4
 With respect to implied findings, findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume 
that the trial court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to 
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual determination it made." Hall v. 
Hall. 858 P.2 d 1018, 1025 (Ut. App. 1993). 
12 
quoting Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 
P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983). In State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Court 
cited Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 
635 (1971) by Professor Maurice Rosenberg (hereinafter Rosenberg) to discuss the 
appellate review spectrum. The metaphor of a pasture was used to describe the degrees 
of discretion: 
To the extent that a trial judge's pasture is small because he or she is fenced 
in closely by the appellate courts and given little room to roam in applying 
a stated legal principle to facts, the operative standard approximates what 
can be described as 'de novo'. . . . But to the extent that the pasture is large, 
the trial judge has considerable freedom in applying a legal principle to the 
facts, freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not make 
themselves ab initio but will not reverse - in effect, creating the freedom to 
be wrong without incurring reversal. Only when the trial judge crosses an 
existing fence or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely 
defining the law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available 
does the trial judge's decision exceed the broad discretion granted. 
14 at 937-938. 
The Court explained this principle by reference to Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), where the Court stripped back the law 
on the doctrine of waiver to its most basic form. The Court recognized that its previous 
cases had developed an inconsistent elaboration on waiver based on the specific facts of 
the cases. The Court acknowledged the futility of trying to craft such a fact-specific 
doctrine and simply instructed trial courts to apply the basic doctrine to the facts of the 
case. In commenting on the Soter's case, the Court in Pena observed: 
The net effect was to say that waiver is a highly fact-dependent question, 
one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we 
cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of 
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such decisions. In terms of our present discussion, Soter's increased the 
size of the trial court's pasture because we found ourselves unable to 
describe the share of the smaller one with adequate clarity. 
State v. Pena. supra. 869 P.2d at 938. 
In summarizing, the Court in Pena, cited to Rosenberg to set forth three 
circumstances where discretion ought to be left to the trial court: (1) when the facts are so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing these facts can be spelled out; (2) 
"when the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the 
courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what 
factors should be outcome determinative"; and (3) when the trial judge has observed 
things such as appearance and demeanor of a witness that cannot be adequately reflected 
in the record. Id. at 939. 
These principles should operate here to cause the Court to grant discretion to the 
Commission. First, the question of what constitutes the public interest is complex and 
not easily susceptible to a bright-line rule determination. The public interest 
determination is a fact specific determination and should, contrary to Western Wireless' 
assertion, not be reviewed de novo by this Court, since it is highly unlikely that a 
coherent statement of the law can be established given the fact dependent circumstances 
of such a standard. 
Moreover, not only is the ETC public interest determination a new area of inquiry 
in a rapidly changing telecommunications environment where the "pasture" has not been 
fenced closely, the issue of whether it is in the public interest to designate a second ETC 
in rural areas of the State, is a matter federal statute specifically charges the Commission 
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with the responsibility to determine. See 47 U.S.C. 214(e). Where the policy 
determination of what constitutes the public interest has been vested in the Commission, 
this Court should grant "operational discretion" to the Commission's application of the 
facts to the public interest standard and should be reluctant to overturn the Commission's 
determination. See, e.g. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994), citing State v. 
Pena, supra, 869 P.2d at 935-36. The Court views this Pena standard as "a more 
accurate measure of the degree of deference to be given to an agency, taking into account 
factors such as policy concerns and an agency's expertise. . . . " Drake v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, 939 P.2d at 181. 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) Utah Code Ann (2001) also indicates that an appellate 
court may grant relief if an agency's action is "an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute." Appellate courts defer to an agency's statutory interpretation "when 
there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Morton Int'l, Inc. 
v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). When such a grant exists, 
appellate courts will not disturb the agency's ruling unless its determination exceeds "the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial 
Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah App. 1998). The Commission regularly 
determines the public interest in proceedings before it pursuant to a statutory delegation.5 
5
 The Commission must make a public interest determination in granting a certificate of 
convenience and public necessity. Moreover, the Commission is charged by State statute to 
determine whether allowing a competitive local exchange carrier, regulated by the Commission, 
to offer public telecommunications services in the service territory of an incumbent telephone 
15 
Here, where the Commission is specifically charged by both federal and state statutes to 
make the ultimate public interest determination, and has the expertise to make such 
determinations, this Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. 
Not only does Western Wireless advance an erroneous standard of review in its 
argument, Western Wireless asks this Court to violate principles of appellate review and, 
rather than remanding for additional proceedings if the record is insufficient, enter 
affirmative findings that Western Wireless should be designated an ETC. See 
Petitioner's Brief, p. 10, 32 and 46. Under no circumstances should this Court 
affirmatively rule that Western Wireless should be designated an ETC. The Court has 
stated that it will not substitute its own findings for the Commission's on appellate review 
of Commission orders. Mt. States Legal Foundation v. Public Service Commission, 846 
P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981) ("nor are we authorized to make findings not made by the 
Commission"). The Court does not have the authority to modify or partially set aside a 
Commission order. Upon hearing a petition, the Court is only empowered to affirm or set 
aside a Commission order. Telecommunications Resellers, supra, 747 P.2d at 1030. 
As set forth below, Western Wireless failed to set forth an adequate evidentiary 
record on which the Commission could find that designation of it as an ETC was in the 
public interest. On the contrary, the record contains substantial evidence that such 
corporation is in the public interest. The Commission has the statutory authority to exclude a 
competitor from an exchange of less than 5,000 access lines based on a public interest standard. 
See e.g. § 54-8b-2.1 Utah Code Ann. (2001). 
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designation was not in the public interest and the Commission's Report and Order should 
be affirmed. 
III. The Commission Correctly Determined that Western Wireless Failed to 
Establish that ETC Designation was in the Public Interest. 
Western Wireless failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conclusion 
that designating it as an ETC in areas served by Utah rural telephone companies was in 
the public interest. Western Wireless was required to present an adequate evidentiary 
record upon which the Commission could conclude that designating Western Wireless as 
an additional ETC would be in the public interest. The burden rested on Western 
Wireless to prove it was entitled to the relief requested. See, e.g. Utah Department of 
Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 614 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1980). 
Western Wireless did not meet the burden of establishing that its request for ETC 
designation was in the public interest. Western Wireless presented a limited case before 
the Commission. It only called one witness and this witness failed to provide a basis for 
the Commission to make a public interest determination in Western Wireless' favor. 
A. Western Wireless Did Not Provide Adequate Evidence on the Services it Would 
Offer. 
Western Wireless never provided specific evidence about the telecommunications 
services it intended to offer as an ETC. Because of the failure to provide technical 
information, information on price, the terms and conditions of the offering and a time 
schedule for offering the services, the Commission was wholly deprived of sufficient 
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information for it to make a public interest determination.6 It is a hollow argument to 
merely claim in the abstract that competition is good without providing the specific 
information and data upon which the Commission can determine the nature, terms and 
conditions of the proposed competition, including price. 
Western Wireless did not even provide evidence that it can provide universal 
service throughout the service areas. It merely advanced that it "will" offer a universal 
service package. This refusal or inability to provide evidence was clearly a major reason 
why the Division opposed Western Wireless' ETC designation. During meetings with 
the Division, Western Wireless never provided documentation detailing the service and 
equipment they intended to offer and thus, the Division was unable to validate the claims 
of Western Wireless. (R00298, Prefiled Testimony of Ingo Henningsen, p. 8; R00299, 
Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Peggy N. Egbert, p. 11). Western Wireless refused to 
provide evidence, inter alia, regarding (1) the common existence of service gaps; (2) a 
map of its actual current and intended network coverage; (3) the traffic and blocking 
limits of its network and how it would handle the significantly increased burdens it would 
face if Western Wireless became an ETC; (4) a financial plan, budget or any other 
evidence showing Western Wireless had the ability to carry out its plans at an affordable 
6
 It is particularly interesting to note that while here Western Wireless provided no 
information on prices and specific services, in the Wyoming FCC case, upon which it relies so 
heavily, Western Wireless provided "supplemental information relating to the services offered, the 
charges for those services, and availability of customer assistance services." Western Wireless 
Corporation Petition for Designation as an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier in the State of 
Wyoming, CC Docket No. 96-45 (12-26-2000), \ 11, included in Petitioner's Addendum at 
ADD-73. Western Wireless provided no explanation as to why it did not similarly supplement 
the record in this docket. Its failure to do so, however, results in a wholly inadequate record to 
support the conclusions it advances. 
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price; or (5) a technical or engineering model or plan describing how Western Wireless 
would implement its services.7 
Western Wireless asserted that it has coverage throughout the service area. Yet, it 
provided only a conclusory statement rather than any detail that it had such coverage. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 12). Western Wireless' witness stated that he based his 
assertions of signal coverage on models prepared under the direction of the company. 
Yet, he admitted that such models hadn't been submitted to the Commission and didn't 
know why they had not been submitted. (R00221, Transcript, p. 298). When pushed, 
the witness acknowledged that Western Wireless could have gaps in the coverage area 
and may have areas where it would need to enhance signal strength. (R00220, 
Transcript, p. 12, 304). Western Wireless admitted that mountains can prevent a signal 
reaching a customer. (R00221, Transcript, p. 300). It also admitted that it would not 
know if it had signal to any given customer until it went out to the customer's residence. 
(R00221, Transcript, p. 303-304). Western Wireless acknowledged it may have to add 
antennas, increase the strength of a cell site, add channels to increase capacity and add 
towers. (R00220, Transcript, p. 12, 37; R00221, Transcript, p. 308). In rebuttal of 
Western Wireless's assertion about full coverage, URTA's witness testified that he had 
learned, without making a survey or specific inquiry, that the company did not have 
7
 (R00220, Transcript, p. 24, 26; R00221, Transcript, p. 323). With respect to a 
financial plan and technical model, it is interesting to note that Western Wireless admitted at the 
hearing, that it had a budget and a technical model regarding its Nebraska universal service plans. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 25-26). It is logical to infer that such data exists regarding Utah, but that 
Western Wireless chose not to provide it to the Commission. 
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coverage in at least two cities in the designated coverage area. (R00221, Transcript, p. 
393, 413, 434). He stated that if Western Wireless had provided the requested 
information on its network, including cell sites, it would help to determine if there were 
other areas without signal coverage. (R00221, Transcript, p. 434-435). 
The fact is, Western Wireless did not submit any detailed information about its 
Utah network. (R00221, Transcript, p. 550-551). It submitted a map but the map 
didn't take into account signal coverage based on topography and other factors. (R00221, 
Transcript, p. 539-540). Western Wireless claimed that its network was designed to take 
into account topography. Yet, it provided no information on the signal strength of its 
network due to topographic features. For example, Western Wireless should have 
submitted information on the number of towers and how far apart they are located. 
(R00221, Transcript, p. 275-276). Western Wireless admitted that it had the 
information on the number of towers and where they were located, but had not provided 
it to the Commission. (R00221, Transcript, p. 299). Western Wireless' witness also 
admitted that the company had data on the traffic volume its current network could 
handle in Utah but that this information also wasn't submitted to the Commission. 
(R00221, Transcript, p. 309-310). 
The principle problem with Western Wireless' approach is that it asked the 
Commission to accept its bare assertions without any data or support. Western Wireless 
never provided to the Commission information on its universal service offering, its 
pricing and its approach to customer-specific issues. In fact, it consciously decided it 
would not provide such information to the Commission until after it obtained ETC 
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designation. (R0051, Prefiled Direct Testimony of Gene DeJordy, p. 16). Perhaps 
Western Wireless simply didn't perform all of the analysis necessary. Western Wireless' 
witness, for example, stated he didn't know how many customers the network could 
handle. (R00220, Transcript, p. 104). He had no idea of the projected costs for the 
proposed universal service offering in Utah. (R00220, Transcript, p. 28). He was also 
not aware of how many full-time employees would be allocated to Utah if Western 
Wireless became an ETC. (R00220, Transcript, p. 27). Western Wireless' also testified 
that it expected the usage of its network to increase if ETC status were granted, but didn't 
have an estimate of by how much. (R00220, Transcript, p. 41, 105). But Western 
Wireless acknowledged that adding a tower could cost several hundred thousand dollars, 
that antennas could cost several thousand dollars and that the base unit would cost 
between $300 and $400. (R00220, Transcript, p. 43-45). Western Wireless expected 
to use universal service funds to defray the costs of expanding its Utah network. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 42). However, because Western Wireless didn't know what 
towers and antennas it would add, apparently what such costs would be was completely 
unknown. Moreover, Western Wireless is attempting to get ETC certification in 13 
states. It stated that it will make whatever financial commitment is necessary in Utah. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 54-55). Yet, it provided nothing to support its capability to fulfill 
this commitment. Since the Commission had no data on which to base a determination 
as to the projected amount of such costs for Utah, it simply had no way of knowing 
whether Western Wireless could meet this commitment. 
Moreover, Western Wireless acknowledged that as soon as it gets ETC status, it 
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has an obligation to immediately provide the universal service offering. (R00220, 
Transcript, p. 150). Yet, it didn't submit any implementation plan to the Commission to 
indicate that it would be able to do so. (R00220, Transcript, p. 150). Without plans in 
place, it is unrealistic to suppose that Western Wireless can roll out service 
simultaneously throughout the service area. (R00221, Transcript, p. 279). 
The failure to provide requested information constitutes an adequate reason, 
standing alone, to deny Western Wireless's application for ETC designation. Because of 
the dearth of detail, the Commission was justifiably concerned about what it was Western 
Wireless intended to offer, at what price and when it intended to offer services. 
B. The Record Was Inadequate to Establish Purported Benefits of ETC Designation. 
The Commission recognized that granting ETC status to Western Wireless would 
seriously jeopardize the state Fund and would not be in the public interest. The 
Commission has a fundamental responsibility to safeguard the finite Fund and to see that 
it is used appropriately to provide the greatest benefits to Utah telecommunications 
customers. The Commission found that designating Western Wireless as an ETC in the 
areas served by the rural telephone companies would result in a significantly increased 
burden on the Fund. (R00198, Report and Order, p. 12-13). Furthermore, the services 
offered by Western Wireless do not swing the public interest balance in its favor, because 
the costs of such services may be up to 125 percent higher than the incumbent's prices. 
(R00198, Report and Order, p. 13). 
Western Wireless asserted that it meets the public interest test simply by its 
existence as a competitor. (R0051, Preflled Direct Testimony of Gene DeJordy, p. 21). 
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It claims that failure to designate Western Wireless as an ETC would deprive customers 
of the benefits of competition. However, Western Wireless produced a wholly 
insufficient record to establish the alleged benefits of its service to consumers. Western 
Wireless claims that the Commission ignored the benefits Western Wireless' designation 
will bring to rural consumers. Petitioner's Brief, p.22. On the contrary, it must be 
concluded that the Commission considered these purported benefits, to the extent the 
insufficient record on this subject would allow, and found them insubstantial. Western 
Wireless did not provide adequate information to the Commission about the pricing, 
services and offerings for the Commission to determine benefits to rural consumers by 
designating Western Wireless as an ETC. To the extent such information was provided, 
it mandates a conclusion that the benefits were minimal. 
1. Pricing of Services. The Commission noted in its Report and Order that the 
prices Western Wireless will charge may be significantly higher than rural telephone 
company prices. The Commission observed that Western Wireless's "prices may well be 
higher than the incumbent prices, up to 125% of the incumbent's prices, therefore 
offering a lower cost service is not a benefit that can be counted on to balance out the 
public interest equation." (R00198, Report and Order, p. 11). Western Wireless did not 
demonstrate that its supported services will be priced at affordable levels as required by 
Section 254 of the Act. Whether or not a service is available at an affordable rate is 
critical to achieving the purposes of universal service reflected in § 254(e) and the public 
interest under § 214(e)(2). Section 254(e) of the Federal Act provides that "the [FCC] 
and the States should ensure that universal service is available at rates that are just, 
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reasonable, and affordable." See 47 U.S.C. §254(b)(l). The FCC has indicated that the 
states "should exercise initial responsibility" and have the "primary responsibility for 
determining affordability of rates." See Universal Service Order, at }^ 108, 118.. 
The Commission, however, could not make a determination of affordability. 
Western Wireless refused to provide information regarding its anticipated rates to be 
charged for its universal service offering. (R00119, WWC Holding Cormpany;s 
Responses to US West's First Discovery Requests). It based its refusal in part on the 
ground that, as a wireless provider, it is not subject to rate regulation of the Commission. 
(R0051, Prefiled Direct Testimony of Gene DeJordy, p. 24). Western Wireless did not 
commit to a particular offering nor did it inform the Commission what price they will 
charge for the intended services. (R00219, Transcript, p. 127-128). It admitted, 
however, that it was unable to make final decisions regarding prices of its universal 
service offerings until it was designated an ETC. (R00119, WWC Holding Company's 
Responses to US West's First Discovery Requests, Response to Request No. 4). It also 
stated that "pricing will depend upon the full scope of services offered, the subsidy funds 
available and market forces." (R00125, Reply Testimony of James Blundell, p. 27). 
Western Wireless also admitted that it didn't know what any of the rural telephone 
companies presently charge for any of their services , but nevertheless claimed without 
this information that its services would be priced comparably. (R00219, Transcript, p. 
331). Western Wireless could conceivably, offer only a luxury offering with additional 
non-supported services such as voice mail, caller ID and could charge whatever it wanted. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 131). 
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It is also clear that the Commission should not designate a second ETC unless the 
Commission can be assured that reasonable service packages and rates will continue to be 
provided by that ETC. Since Western Wireless did not provide any information to make 
the determination of whether its universal service package would be reasonable and 
affordable, it was properly not designated an ETC. In fact, evidence indicated that 
pricing of Western Wireless' services would be significantly higher than that of the rural 
telephone companies. Increased prices to consumers is not in the public interest. 
Therefore, the Commission correctly recognized that Western Wireless did not offer a 
lower cost service as a benefit that "could be counted on to balance out the public interest 
equation." (R00198, Report and Order, p. 11). 
2. Inferior Service Quality. Quality service is a fundamental principle of 
universal service identified in the 1996 Act. 47 U.S.C. §254(b)(l). The substitutability 
of service quality is also an important public interest consideration. This Commission 
should evaluate the public interest with respect to the ability of any potential second ETC 
to serve all consumers with similar service quality to the services of the first ETC. A 
designated ETC has the full obligation to provide all of the services supported by the plan 
throughout the entire service area and to provide services which are equal in quality. 
Western Wireless also did not establish that its services were of a quality to 
sustain a public interest determination. Western Wireless asserted that it would provide 
a top quality service option to its customers and, in the hearing, stated it would provide a 
more modern, up-dated network than the rural telephone companies. (R00221, 
Transcript, p. 337). Yet, as outlined above, this bald assertion was made without 
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adequate supporting data as to its network and services and also, without knowledge 
whatsoever of the rural telephone companies networks, equipment or services. Western 
Wireless' witness admitted that he didn't know whether the rural telephone companies in 
whose area Western Wireless intended to serve had an analog or digital switch; (R00221, 
Transcript, p. 338). He admitted that he had no information about their equipment or 
network. (R00221, Transcript, p. 338). In fact, he admitted that he didn't know vis-a-vis 
those companies whether Western Wireless provides a more updated, reliable service 
than they do. (R00221, Transcript, p. 338). Western Wireless certainly didn't establish 
that its services would be better than those offered by the rural telephone companies. In 
fact, as set forth below, its services are inferior to the rural telephone companies. 
3. An undefined Local Calling Area. The record is vague about the local calling 
area Western Wireless intended to provide. Western Wireless claimed that it would 
provide a "larger" local calling area. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 28-30. In discovery, it 
stated that it would "likely" have local calling areas that are larger than those of the 
incumbent LECs. However, it admitted that it had "not determined the exact extent" of 
these local calling areas. (R00119, WWC Holding Company's Responses to US West's 
First Discovery Requests, Response to Request No. 28). However, at the hearing, the 
Western Wireless witness demonstrated a lack of knowledge about the local calling areas 
and could not answer how or where Western Wireless' calling areas would be larger. He 
simply did not know what Western Wireless' local calling area would be. (R00220, 
Transcript, p. 78-79, 161-162). Inability to describe the local calling area, its 
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boundaries and how such boundaries would be determined, hardly establishes a public 
interest benefit. 
4. "Mobility" has not Been Established as a Public Interest Benefit. Western 
Wireless also asserts that the public interest is established by the "mobility" of its 
possible service. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 31-32. However, other than the fact that its 
equipment could be moved, there was no evidence that such mobility was different than 
what is currently available to telephone subscribers of the incumbent's network using 
cordless phones. Western Wireless failed to establish benefits that its equipment would 
have over currently available service. 
C. Moreover, the Record is Replete With Evidence that the Detriments of ETC 
Designation are Substantial. 
The record is clear that designation of Western Wireless as an ETC would be 
contrary to the public interest because of the serious risk of negative consequences to 
rural Utah. The Commission recognized that the purported benefits claimed by Western 
Wireless of allowing a second ETC were clearly outweighed by the detrimental impacts 
of granting ETC status. 
1. Negative Impacts on the Universal Service Fund. 
The potential negative impacts on the state Fund, identified by the Commission in 
the Report and Order, are reason alone to justify the denial of ETC status in areas served 
by the rural telephone companies. Contrary to what Western Wireless contends, the 
impact on the funding and level of the Fund is a legitimate factor to consider in a public 
interest determination. As was brought out at the hearing, the demographics of rural 
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Utah don't support additional ETC designations. A fast-growing, higher volume market 
in urban Utah could be divided among competitors without substantial detrimental effects 
on any set of customers. (R00221, Transcript, p. 452). However, in areas possessing 
little or no growth (areas in which URTA members serve), it would be economically 
inefficient and not in the public interest for a second carrier to divert customers from the 
incumbent. Competition could exacerbate under-utilization of an incumbent's facilities 
in low growth, static areas. In such an area, diversion of customers would result in 
stranded capacity. (R00221, Transcript, p. 452-454). Loss of customers in such an 
area would result in very little reduction of costs, thus average costs would increase and 
prices elevated in line with increases in average costs. (R00300, Prefiled Direct 
Testimony of Dr. George Compton, p. 13). Yet if support is on a per-line basis, 
universal service support will decrease. The incumbent receives less universal service 
support, but since its costs haven't decreased, the incumbent must receive additional 
universal service support from the Fund to preserve its same cost recovery or it must raise 
rates. In these rural exchanges, network scale economy losses would more than 
outweigh any efficiencies gained from competition. 8 
Rural telephone companies are more vulnerable to the effects of the loss of only a 
few, or even one, of their higher volume customers. This leaves the rural telephone • 
8
 This loss of scale economies is not offset by reduced costs to customers. The 
Commission recognized this when it found that Western Wireless' prices would not be lower than 
those of the incumbent telephone company and "therefore offering a lower cost service is not a 
benefit that can be counted on to balance out the public interest equation." (R00198, Report and 
Order, p., 11). 
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companies and their customers far more vulnerable to "cream skimming". (R00292, 
Direct Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 25). Such a practice will increase the 
costs of the remaining customers and lead to increases in local rates. An incumbent's 
average costs would increase if customers abandon the incumbent to subscribe to the 
entrant's services, since there would be very little reduction in the incumbent's costs. 
Costs are largely fixed and sunk. Prices may then be increased in line with elevated 
average costs. (R00140 Rebuttal Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 3). 
Even Western Wireless's witness admitted that if the incumbent's customer base is 
static or declining, the loss of customers and the resulting loss of revenues could result in 
increased average costs for the incumbent. (R00221, Transcript, p. 345). Moreover, he 
could give no specific examples of how the rural companies in Utah could offset this loss 
of customers by increased efficiencies or how they could reduce costs. (R00221, 
Transcript, p. 345-349). 
Designation of a second ETC may also discourage investment, and even provide 
incentives for current ETCs to withdraw from providing service to the highest cost 
portions of their service areas. (R00221, Transcript, p. 453-455; R00292, Direct 
Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 28). If a second ETC is designated in rural 
areas, the incumbent rural telephone company will recognize the risks of providing 
service to the highest cost portions of their service areas and may seek to reduce that risk 
by not investing in the customers that are the most expensive to serve. (R00292, Direct 
Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 28). Duplication of facilities and loss of 
network investment is not in the public interest where market demand and foreseeable 
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growth would not otherwise support multiple providers. 
Providing universal service funding to a second ETC for a duplicate competing 
network may have the detrimental effect of depriving either network of the necessary 
USF support, with the result that neither network will be able to provide the level of 
advanced services to all at prices comparable to urban areas. The Division's concerns 
about a second ETC in rural Utah bear repeating: 
Rural carriers in Utah now are all still rate of return regulated. Any 
revenue shortfalls must be made up through higher rates to remaining 
customers or through higher USF payments. And this will be true, I 
believe, as long as those companies remain regulated under rate of return, 
which is no longer the case for US West. Therefore, movement of any USF 
funds to a second carrier will need [sic] the higher costs to remaining Utah 
customers. 
Although some expenses may be eliminated or plant become no 
longer used and useful, the loss of only a few customers may be devastating 
to some of Utah's very small, independent carriers. If any of these 
companies are unable to continue to invest in new plants or are unable to 
continue operations altogether, customers will be left with inferior services 
or be forced to purchase service from Western Wireless, which claims that 
it's not subject to any Commission regulation and provides a service that in 
many ways is much different than what is currently available. 
(R00221, Transcript, p. 552-553, Testimony of Ingo Henningsen). 
URTA's witness also testified that the harm which would be caused in rural Utah 
will outweigh any possible minimal benefits that could result in the future for an 
unknown number of customers. He stated that: 
Designating Western Wireless as an ETC will remove substantial universal 
service support from rural [telephone incumbents], which would make it 
difficult for them to continue to make investments in order to supply the full 
array of high-quality telecommunications and data services their customers 
expect.... [Rural companies] have very limited customer bases consisting 
of small towns and farms and ranches, all of which are costly to serve yet 
provide limited revenue-producing opportunities. Also, as a general rule, 
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there is very little growth in access lines.. . . If the universal service 
support such companies receive were drawn away by another carrier, it 
would immediately diminish the rural company's ability to invest in 
network upgrades and to add new advanced services for customers as in the 
past. Rural companies would eventually be unable to make the investments 
to serve customers. The base of customers is too small, and costs too 
substantial, to withstand a loss or support without requiring a decrease in 
levels of investment or greatly increasing local rates. Less investment, of 
course, eventually will result in declining service for customers. 
(R00292, Direct Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 14-15). 
In summary, designating a second ETC in rural areas will either result in an 
increase in the total costs of providing USF support or result in neither ETC receiving the 
funding needed to provide and maintain the network in high cost areas. (R00292, Direct 
Testimony of Raymond A. Hendershot, p. 29). Thus, designation of a second ETC will 
result in an increased USF burden. (R00140, Rebuttal Testimony of Raymond A. 
Hendershot, p. 4). The Commission clearly recognized this detrimental impact on the 
Fund in denying Western Wireless's petition and took this evidence into account in 
issuing its Report and Order. 
2. The Unrebutted Evidence Submitted by the Division Supports the 
Conclusion that ETC Designation was not in the Public Interest. 
The Division's witness Dr. George Compton provided extensive testimony on the 
public interest standard which was unrebutted. Dr. Compton testified that there was no 
evidence of any cost savings that would result from designation of Western Wireless as 
an ETC. Dr. Compton analyzed the growth rates in each of the counties which contain 
exchanges where Western Wireless is seeking ETC status. Dr. Compton concluded that 
in the small, slow growing exchanges any network economy losses would more than 
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outweigh any efficiencies gained from competition. (R00300, Prefiled Direct Testimony 
of George Compton, p. 6-9).9 
Designation of Western Wireless as an ETC would also not result in lower prices 
to consumers. Dr. Compton testified that competition from a second ETC may result in 
prices actually increasing in rural areas. Competition would exacerbate the tendency for 
there to be an under-utilization of the incumbent's facilities. (R00300, Prefiled Direct 
Testimony of George Compton, p. 8). Areas possessing little or no growth [areas in 
which URTA members serve] would constitute areas where it would most likely be 
inefficient for a second carrier to come in and divert customers from the incumbent. 
There, capacity would more likely be stranded over a longer term by customers 
abandoning the incumbent's system in order to subscribe to the entrant's services. 
(R00300, Prefiled Direct Testimony of George Compton , p., 7). When a rural 
incumbent's average costs go up (due, for example, to a loss of customers and very little 
reduction in costs owing to costs being largely fixed and sunk) prices may be elevated in 
line with elevate average costs. (R00300, Prefiled Direct Testimony of George 
Compton, p. 12). 
These factors led the Division to conclude that there would be an increased burden 
on the state Fund if Western Wireless were designated as an ETC. The increased use of 
universal service funds to mitigate the afore-mentioned detrimental impacts in rural Utah 
was the principal basis on which the Division (and thereafter the Commission) concluded 
9
 It should be noted that Western Wireless did not provide the forward-looking cost data 
requested by the Division. (R00300, Prefiled Direct Testimony of George Compton p., 7). 
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that the detriments of ETC designation outweigh any potential benefits. (R00300, 
Prefiled Direct Testimony of George Compton, p. 14, 17). 10 
3. The Evidence Clearly Established that Western Wireless' Service is Inferior 
to Traditional Wireline Service. 
The record demonstrated that Western Wireless's service is less reliable than 
traditional wireline. As stated by Dr. Compton, "In some of its technical specifications, 
wireless telephony of the nature proposed in the current Western Wireless application 
probably delivers lower service quality than does conventional wireline technology." 
(R00300, Prefiled Direct Testimony of George Compton, p. 10, 11). Western Wireless' 
service is substandard compared to wireline service. (R00296, Pre-filed Direct 
Testimony of Phil Bullock for the Committee of Consumer Services, p. 1). Western 
Wireless's service is more susceptible to topographic disruption from routine causes, such 
as trees, foliage, hills, and other physical objects. Further, the service may be disrupted 
by routine weather conditions, such as rain and snow. (R00299, Rebuttal Testimony of 
Western Wireless misconstrued Dr. Compton's testimony to conclude that Western 
Wireless would serve customers who are not currently receiving service in rural telephone 
company service territories. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 26-27. Dr. Compton's testimony was in 
the nature of general principles. He did not testify that Western Wireless would in fact serve 
such individuals. (R00221, Transcript, p. 632-634). In his pre-filed testimony, Dr. Compton 
made it clear that even though there may be some customers who haven't been able to receive 
service, this was not a sufficient fact to cause him to conclude that the public interest would be 
served by designating Western Wireless as an ETC. (R00300, Direct Testimony of George 
Compton, p. 17-18). URTA members also have the potential to serve such individuals. There 
was no evidence submitted that any specific benefit was attained by designating Western Wireless 
as an ETC in that it would serve such customers where the incumbent LECs would not. As set 
forth above, Western Wireless' failure to provide specifics about its intended service, leads to the 
conclusion that the Commission had no way of knowing whether Western Wireless would in fact 
serve such individuals. 
33 
Peggy N. Egbert, p. 16). The record also shows that wireline service is far more capable 
of meeting customer demands for advanced services, such as high speed internet service 
and that Western Wireless would have difficulty providing customers access to the 
internet at desired connection speeds. (R00299, Rebuttal Testimony of Peggy N. Egbert, 
p. 8-10; Transcript, p. 156, 589; See also R00140 Rebuttal Testimony of Raymond A. 
Hendershot, p. 3). 
Due to an absolute right of an incumbent to relinquish ETC designation, evidence 
of landline substitutability is part of the public interest inquiry. Under § 214(e)(1), an 
ETC is required to offer the services that are supported by the federal universal support 
mechanisms under section 254(c) throughout the entire service area for which the 
designation is received. Section 254(e) and §214(e) operate together to spread the 
requirement to provide universal service among all ETCs within a designated area and to 
give the incumbent ETC the option to be relieved of that responsibility entirely if a 
second ETC is designated within the same area. If there are multiple ETCs in a service 
area and one ETC seeks to relinquish its ETC status in that area, the Commission is 
required to allow it to withdraw. 47 U.S.C. §214(e)(4). The statute provides: 
A State commission shall permit an eligible telecommunications carrier to 
relinquish its designation as such a carrier in any area served by more than 
one eligible telecommunications carrier. An eligible telecommunications 
carrier that seeks to relinquish its eligible telecommunications carrier 
designation for an area served by more than one eligible 
telecommunications carrier shall give advanced notice to the State 
commission of such relinquishment. Prior to permitting a 
telecommunications carrier designated as an eligible telecommunications 
carrier to cease providing universal service in an areas served by more than 
one eligible telecommunications carrier, the State commission shall require 
the remaining eligible telecommunications carrier or carriers to ensure that 
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all customers served by the relinquishing carrier will continue to be served. 
47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(4)(emphasis added). That withdrawal places the responsibility for 
serving the entire area solely upon the remaining ETC. This requires the Commission to 
closely consider the applicant's ability to offer supported services which are substitutable 
for the incumbent's if it were to become the sole provider of such services in the service 
area. Nevertheless, Western Wireless asserted that it doesn't have to provide a service 
which is substitutable for a landline. (R00220, Transcript, p. 107). Moreover, it 
provided no evidence that it could meet the responsibilities of being the sole ETC in the 
event of relinquishment. (R00220, Transcript, p. 112-113). Western Wireless basically 
wanted the Commission to take its word for it that it could step up to this responsibility. 
(R00220, Transcript, p. 113). If a second ETC is designated, the already very high risks 
of capital investment become materially higher. The result may well be that many of the 
rural telephone companies would be unable to continue to commit, to the level they do 
today, the capital to provide quality, advanced telecommunications services. 
In making the public interest finding, the Commission resolved the dilemma of 
how to allocate scarce resources (universal service funding) to provide universal service 
to customers. The effect of the Report and Order is to not grant ETC status to an 
applicant who has not made an adequate showing as to its service quality, particularly 
where there is also evidence on the record that its service is inferior. 
D. Western Wireless Erroneously Interprets Federal and State Law. 
Western Wireless in discussing the public interest, ignores the impact that a 
second ETC could have on the universal service fund and focuses instead only on the 
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argument that competition is in the public interest. In so doing, Western Wireless 
dismisses the requirements of Section 214(e) regarding rural areas, where competition is 
not the paramount consideration. Western Wireless' reliance on Alenco 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC. 201 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2000) is misplaced. Western 
Wireless argues that Alenco requires that universal service provisions must be 
implemented in a way that mandates competition. This is an incorrect reading of the 
case and ignores the fact that the Alenco court recognized that only those qualifying as 
ETCs are eligible to receive universal service support. The Court stated: "To the extent 
petitioners argue that Congress recognized the precarious competitive positions of rural 
LECs, their concerns are addressed by 47 U.S.C. § 214(e) which empowers state 
commissions to regulate entry into rural markets." Id at 622. Thus, the court 
recognized that the provisions of Section 214(e) can override in rural areas. While 
recognizing the public interest determination under Section 214(e) as a basis to deny ETC 
status, the issue of what constitutes such a public interest determination to deny ETC 
status was not before the court. In no event, however, should the case be read to 
eliminate the Commission's discretion to refuse to designate an ETC to protect the 
viability of a universal service fund. 
Western Wireless is also incorrect in asserting that state law mandates that 
Western Wireless should receive support from the Fund. The provisions of the Fund in 
Section 8b-15 must be read in concert with the other provisions of the Utah 
Telecommunications Act. The provisions in Section 8b-15 make it clear that a company 
has to be a "qualifying telecommunications corporation" in order to receive funds. See 
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§54-8b-15(7) and (8) Utah Code Ann. (2001).11 This implicitly recognizes that some 
telecommunications corporations may not qualify for universal service support. The Act 
mandates that the Commission consider the public interest in determining whether there 
should be additional competition in the local exchange market for small telephone 
exchanges. See §54-8b-2.1(2) Utah Code Ann. (2001). The Act specifically recognizes 
that in exchanges with less than 5,000 access lines, a competitive local exchange carrier 
may not be granted a certificate, when it is not in the public interest. See §54-8b-
2.1 (3)(c) Utah Code Ann. (2001). If a carrier is not entitled to be certificated, logically it 
is not entitled to USF support. Under Utah law then, as in the Act, the promotion of 
competition is not the only consideration. 
Western Wireless also asserts that the Report and Order violates 47 U.S.C. §§ 253 
and 254. The argument that the Report and Order "may prohibit or have the effect of 
prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service" 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) is erroneous. Western Wireless is not 
prohibiting from offering any services. In fact, it took the position that it was already 
offering services in rural Utah. Similarly, Western Wireless' argument that the Report 
and Order violates §253(b) by not being competitively neutral, since some companies 
will have access to universal service funds while others will not, fails to take into account 
the other provisions of the Act. If Congress had intended that competitive neutrality 
means that any and every telecommunications company must have access to universal 
11
 Even Western Wireless included in its brief the language that universal service support 
was available only to "qualifying" providers. See Petitioner's Brief, p. 21. 
37 
service funds, there would be no need for an accompanying statutory provision to first 
make a public interest finding to support an ETC designation as a prerequisite to 
entitlement to such funds. The logical conclusion of Western Wireless' argument is that 
universal service funds would be given to every telecommunications company 
irrespective of whether it qualified as an ETC; otherwise competitive neutrality would be 
violated. Such an argument does not comport with universal service policy and statutory 
context of the 1996 Act. 
IV. Section 332(c) Does not Preempt the Commission From Making Universal 
Service Funds Available Only to ETCs that Price Services at No More than 
the Affordable Base Rate. 
Section 47 U.S.C. §332(c) does not preempt the Commission from requiring that 
Western Wireless's universal service offering be priced at the Commission's determined 
affordable base rate. 12 This section provides that an entity engaged in commercial 
mobile radio service ("CMRS") is to be treated as a common carrier under the Act. 47 
U.S.C. §332(c)(l)(A). Subsection (3) of the statute then provides: 
(3) STATE PREEMPTION.-^ A) Notwithstanding sections 2(b) and 221(b), 
no State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry 
of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private 
mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from 
regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services. 
Nothing in this subparagraph shall exempt providers of commercial mobile 
services (where such services are a substitute for land line telephone 
12
 In Texas Office of Public Utilities Counsel v. FCC. 183 F. 3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), the 
court made it clear that states were free to consider additional criteria than what is outlined in § 
214(e). Therefore, states can consider affordability, service quality and customer service in 
determining whether ETC status should be granted. 
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exchange service for a substantial portion of the communications within 
such State) from requirements imposed by a State commission on all 
providers of telecommunications services necessary to ensure the universal 
availability of telecommunications service at affordable rates. 
47U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A)(1999). 
Interpretation of §332(c) must be made in light of §214(e). The extent of the 
prohibition on entry and rate regulation urged by Western Wireless would result in the 
Commission not being able to make any ETC determination, since granting or denying 
Western Wireless' application would constitute regulation of entry for Western Wireless 
into a service territory as an ETC. Even designation of the different service territories in 
which Western Wireless could operate could be construed as entry regulation. Western 
Wireless' approach would also prevent the Commission from making any pricing 
determination for universal service fund support. If a CMRS provider can price its 
universal service offering at any level it desires, the Commission cannot enforce its 
statutory mandate to ensure that rates are just, reasonable and affordable. Section 54-8b-
11 Utah Code Ann. (2001) provides that the Commission should attempt to make 
available high quality universal service at just and reasonable rates to all classes of 
customers throughout the state. Similar objectives are established by the 1996 Act. It 
states that "consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers and 
those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications and 
information services....that are reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban 
areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for 
similar services in urban areas." 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3). 
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The appropriate construction of §332(c)(3)(A) is to prohibit a state from imposing 
entry and rate regulation on a CMRS provider that operates simply as another common 
carrier in the provision of telecommunications services. 13 But where a CMRS provider 
seeks to be designated as an ETC, it is no longer acting simply as a common carrier and 
the restrictions no longer apply. Because the CMRS provider seeks to become an ETC, 
it must comply with the ETC provisions of §214 and universal service provisions of §254. 
One of the central goals of universal service is affordable service. See 47 U.S.C. § 254. 
Not all common carriers are ETCs. It is the voluntary determination to seek ETC status, 
which is a decision to offer a required universal service package in a specified area and to 
receive monies from the state Fund, which imposes an additional obligation to price 
services reasonably. In other words, when Western Wireless crosses the boundary from 
being just another common carrier, to attempting to become an ETC and to receive 
universal service funds, it lost its exemption from rate regulation to the extent that its 
rates must be affordable. Where an entity chooses to become an ETC in order to receive 
universal service funds, it should become subject to the provisions of § 214 and §254. 
Here, the Commission simply held that If Western Wireless expects to receive 
universal service funds, it can only receive reimbursement from the State Fund, for those 
universal service offerings priced at or below the affordable base rate as established by 
the Commission. (R00198, Report and Order, p. 15). All the Commission attempted to 
13
 Even then, the state can regulate entry and price where the CMRS service is a 
substitute for landline services offered by other common carriers. 47 U.S.C. 
§332(c)(3)(A)(1999). 
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do was implement the objective of universal service statutes by insuring that companies 
that receive either state or federal money charge an affordable basic telecommunications 
rate. That was not rate regulation, but rather an appropriate exercise of the Commission's 
responsibility to safeguard universal service funds. Western Wireless does not have to 
price its services at this level. It is free to do otherwise and not receive universal service 
funds. 
V. The Administrative Rule Making Act Does Not Apply. 
Contrary to Western Wireless' contention, the Utah Administrative Rule Making 
Act is not relevant in this proceeding. See §§ 64-46a-l et. seq. Utah Code Ann. (2001). 
The Rule Making Act is clear that orders and decisions arising out of adjudicative 
proceedings are not rules. See §64-46a-2(16)(c) Utah Code Ann. (2001). Rules of law 
developed in the context of agency adjudication are as binding as those promulgated by 
agency rule making. Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain State Telephone & 
Telegraph. 846 P.2d 1245, 1252-1253 (Utah 1992) (an agency must be able to resolve 
legal issues when they arise in the context of adjudication). 
In the Report and Order, the Commission was not singling out Western Wireless 
for the proposition that a carrier to be eligible for universal service funds may not charge 
a rate in excess of the affordable base rate. This was already a requirement for receiving 
universal service support, previously implemented through the rule making process. To 
be eligible to participate in the state Fund, a requesting carrier must be in compliance 
with the rules of the Commission. See § 54-8b-15(8) Utah Code Ann. (2001); R746-
360(7)(A)(1) Utah Administrative Code (2000). Rule R746-360-(7)(B) states: " To be 
41 
eligible, a telecommunications corporation may not charge retail rates in excess of the 
Commission determined Affordable Base Rates for basic telecommunications service or 
vary from the terms and conditions determined by the Commission for other 
telecommunications services for which it receives Universal Service Fund support." 
R746-360(7)(B) Utah Administrative Code (2000). Western Wireless, along with all 
other telecommunications carriers in the State, could have participated in the rule making 
process where it was determined that universal service support funds are only available 
for those who price services at the affordable base rate or below. Moreover, Western 
Wireless and others are free to request that additional rule making be initiated to further 
define the affordable base rate. Given the fact that U S West's rates were set in a rate 
case proceeding in which the Commission was charged with the statutory responsibility 
to make sure that rates were just and reasonable, it was reasonable for the Commission to 
conclude that such rates constituted an affordable base rate, at least in the interim until 
further proceedings can consider such rates. See §54-7-12 Utah Code Ann. (2001). 
URTA will not belabor this point but adopts the arguments the Commission set forth in 
its Brief in asserting that the Rule Making Act has no application to the Commission's 
proceedings below. See Commission's Brief, p. 31-33. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Western Wireless did not meet its burden of establishing that its 
requested ETC designation in rural service areas is in the public interest. On the contrary, 
the evidence clearly supported the Commission's Order that such designation is not in the 
public interest. The Commission's Report and Order was supported by substantial evidence 
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in the record and was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the 
Commission's Report and Order refusing to designate Western Wireless as an ETC in the 
service areas of URTA members. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2001. 
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